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HOLDING THE HIGH GROUND: THE
POSITION OF SECURED CREDITORS
IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCIES
AND PROPOSALS©
By TAMARA M. BUCKWOLD*
This article examines the position of secured creditors
in the event of a consumer debtor's bankruptcy or the
filing of a consumer proposal, as determined by the
federal and provincial laws of Canada. Secured
creditors in Canada are in a remarkably powerful
position relative to other claimants in bankruptcy and
to their counterparts in the United States. Their rights
of realization against the collateral are essentially
unaffected by the initiation of either a consumer
bankruptcy or proposal. Moreover, recent judicial
developments appear to further enhance secured
creditors' rights of enforcement, both against the in
personam payment obligation and against the
bankrupt's property after his or her discharge.
Cet article examine la position des cr6anciers garantis
dans le cas d'une faillite de consommateurs d6biteurs
ou la r6clamation par une proposition de
consommateurs, tels que d6termin6s par les lois
f6d6rales et provinciales au Canada. Les cr6anciers
garantis sont dans une position de force remarquable
par rapport aux autres plaignants en faillite et par
rapport A leurs homologues aux Etats-Unis. Leurs
droits de r6alisation contre le collat6ral ne sont
essentiellement pas affect~s ni par l'initiation d'une
faillite de consommateurs ni par une proposition. En
plus, des d~veloppements juridiques r6cents semblent
favoriser davantage le renforcement des droits des
cr6anciers garantis, a ]a fois contre l'obligation de
paiement in personam et contre la propri6t6 de la
personne en failliteapr-s son acquittement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Secured creditors rarely bear direct responsibility for the
initiation of consumer bankruptcy proceedings, since the rights of
realization associated with their security provide an expeditious route to
debt recovery. Secured debt therefore affects the rate of consumer
bankruptcy principally as a component of the total financial burden
borne by individuals and unincorporated businesses. Heavy secured debt
obligations may also contribute indirectly to default in the payment of
unsecured debt, thereby precipitating bankruptcy through either an
assignment by the debtor or the petition of unsecured creditors. Small
entrepreneurs and individual consumers whose major assets are the
collateral for secured debt may neglect taxation authorities and other
unsecured creditors-in order to avoid defaulting on payment of the
loans underlying the security-in an attempt to avert the seizure of
precious items of collateral. However, no empirical studies are available
to sustain anything but speculative conclusions about the relationship of
secured debt to consumer bankruptcy in Canada.
In the absence of a basis for meaningful commentary on secured
debt as a cause of bankruptcy, an examination of its role must focus on
the converse question, namely, the effect of bankruptcy on secured
creditors' rights. This article therefore explores the legal position of
secured creditors in the context of consumer bankruptcy, and in relation
to consumer proposals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).I
The discussion reveals that secured creditors in Canada "hold the high
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter BL4].
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ground" as compared with other creditors in terms of their ability to
recover debt owed by bankrupt consumers. Neither bankruptcy nor the
approval of a consumer proposal restricts their ability to seize and sell
the property subject to their security in satisfaction of the debt secured.
Regardless of the extent to which secured credit contributes to the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings or the making of a proposal, it will
be seen that secured credit largely operates outside the principles and
policies that otherwise govern creditors' rights in bankruptcy.
II. THE POSITION OF SECURED CREDITORS
The rights of secured creditors outside bankruptcy are
determined by the laws of the respective provinces under their
constitutional jurisdiction over property and civil rights.2 Secured
creditors' rights are twofold: first, they are entitled to enforce the
debtor's contractual promise to pay the debt or perform the payment
obligation arising from the security agreement; second, they are- entitled
to realize on their security. In general, this means that a secured creditor
may seize and sell the property subject to the security interest, and apply
the proceeds to satisfy any sum outstanding.3
The secured creditor's rights of realization are of paramount
importance, since the availability of identified property to satisfy all, or a
significant portion, of the credit advanced offers concrete assurance of
repayment. In contrast, both informal and legal action to enforce the
personal promise to pay are expensive, inefficient, and frequently
unsuccessful. Although federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy clearly
encompasses the statutory modification of the legal position of secured
creditors, Parliament has not intervened in any substantial way in the
exercise of rights of realization.4
2 See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92(13), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5.
3 For a discussion of rights of realization against personal property collateral in Ontario and in
most of the other provinces and territories, see J.S. Ziegel & D.L. Denomme, The Ontario Personal
Property Security Act: Commentary and Analysis (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994); and
R.C.C. Cuming & R.J. Wood, British Columbia Personal Property Security Act Handbook, 3d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1996). For a comprehensive description of rights of realization against land, see
J.E. Roach, The Canadian Law of Mortgages of Land (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1993).
4 The 1992 amendments to the BIA imposed notice and procedural requirements on secured
creditors intending to enforce their security on the business assets of an insolvent person. However,
those requirements simply delay the exercise of rights of realization for a ten-day period, and are, in
any event, not relevant in most consumer bankruptcies: see BiA,supra note 1, s. 244, as am. byAnAct
to amend the Bankruptcy Act and to amend the Income Tax Act in consequence thereof, S.C. 1992, c.
1999]
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By the time a debtor is faced with bankruptcy, he or she will
typically have defaulted in making the payments due under the security
agreements5 giving rise to the secured debt obligations. Even if payments
have been maintained, virtually all security agreements provide that the
making of an assignment or the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
constitutes default by the debtor. In either case, the event of default
triggers the right of secured creditors to realize against the property
subject to their security interests (the collateral) in accordance with the
requirements of provincial law governing the exercise of those rights.
The following discussion therefore proceeds on the assumption that
default is established.
A. The Assertion of Secured Claims Under the BIA
With few exceptions, secured creditors may exercise the rights of
seizure and sale, granted or recognized by provincial law, after the
initiation of their debtor's bankruptcy to the same extent as they can
when a default occurs outside bankruptcy.6 For the most part, these
rights will be determined by the provincial personal property security
acts (PPSAS), 7 real property law, exemptions legislation, and an
assortment of ancillary statutes.8 Provincial law applies without
differentiation to pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy seizures in the
27, s. 89 [hereinafter 1992Amendments].
5 "Security agreement" is used generically to refer to any contract that gives a creditor an
interest in property of the debtor as security for recovery of a debt. This includes real property
mortgages, personal property security agreements, chattel mortgages, conditional sales agreements,
and other consensual security devices.
6 Statements affirming this proposition may be found in many cases. For a recent reiteration,
see Mackesey v. RoyalBank of Canada (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 637 (Sask. C.A.).
7 Statutes of this kind have been enacted by both territories and all of the provinces except
Newfoundland and Quebec. The abbreviation "PPSA" will be used hereinafter generically in
reference to these statutes cumulatively, or specifically in reference to one or more of them as the
context indicates. Identified sections of the British Columbia Personal Property Security Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 359 [hereinafter PPSA (B.c)] will be used to illustrate the content and effect of particular
PPSA provisions. For other jurisdictions, see New Brunswick, Personal Property Security Act, S.N.B.
1993, c. P-7.1 [hereinafterPpsi (N.B.)]; Nova Scotia, Personal Property Security Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c.
13 [hereinafter psPA (.s.)]; Prince Edward Island, Personal Property Security Act, S.P.E.I. 1997, c. 33,
s. 58 [hereinafter PPSA (P.E.L)]; Ontario, Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A-33;
Manitoba, Personal Property Security Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P35; Alberta, Personal Property Security
Act, S.A. 1988, c. P-4.05; Saskatchewan, The Personal Property Security Act, 1993, S.S. 1993, c. P-6.2;
Northwest Territories, Personal Property Security Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 8; Yukon, Personal Property
SecurityAct, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 130.
8 Section 72(1) of the BIA,supra note 1, preserves the operation of provincial laws and statutes
"relating to property and civil rights that are not in conflict with this Act ...."
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absence of conflicting rules in federal bankruptcy legislation. The hA
contains only a few provisions affecting secured creditors' rights. Even
those procedural provisions relating to the filing of proof of claim and
valuations of security are not mandatory, unless the trustee elects to
demand a proof of security.
1. The exemption of secured creditors from the automatic stay
Section 69.3(1) of the BIA imposes a general stay on the exercise
by creditors of any remedy against a bankrupt debtor or that debtor's
property. However, in a reversal of the old axiom, what is taken away
with one hand is, in this case, given to secured creditors with the other.
Insofar as their rights of realization against the bankrupt's property are
concerned, section 69.3(2) exempts secured creditors from the general
stay, providing that "the bankruptcy of a debtor does not prevent a
secured creditor from realizing or otherwise dealing with his security in
the same manner as he would have been entitled to realize or deal with
it if this section had not been passed ...
A secured creditor's right to seize collateral is limited only by
those provisions of the BIA designed to allow the trustee to appraise the
value of the property claimed as security, and to ensure that any residual
value after deduction of the secured claim is made available for the
benefit of the estate10 The philosophy underlying theAct appears to be
correctly stated by Vertes J. in Northwest Territories (Commissioner) v.
Simpson Air: "The policy of the Act is not to interfere with the rights of
secured creditors except insofar as may be necessary to protect the estate
as to any surplus. The Act is clear that the Trustee takes subject to the
rights of the secured creditors."11
While the Act empowers the trustee to redeem property held as
security, the trustee may do so only upon payment in full of the debt
secured or the value of the security.12 If the debt is fully secured, this
means, of course, that the secured creditor will recover the full amount
of his or her claim, whether through realization or through redemption
of the collateral by the trustee.
9 BIA, supra note 1, s. 69.3(2). The court's limited and infrequently exercised jurisdiction under
section 69.3(2) to temporarily postpone a secured creditor's right to realize on his or her security is
discussed in Part II(A)(4), below.
10 See ibid. ss. 79, 127-134,135.
11 [1994] N.W.T.R. 184 at 189 (N.W.T. S.C.) [hereinafter Simpson Air].
12 See BL4,supra note 1, s. 128(3).
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2. Proof of secured claims and procedure on seizure
Most authorities agree that a secured creditor who elects to
realize his or her security after the institution of bankruptcy is free of
any compulsory procedural obligations under the BIA. Although
ostensibly mandatory, the provisions that "(e)very creditor shall prove
his claim,"' 3 and that the proof of claim "shall state" whether the
creditor is or is not secured14 need not be observed by a secured creditor
unless he or she wishes to claim as an unsecured debt any deficiency
remaining after deducting the value of the collateral from the total debt
owed.15 The secured creditor therefore need not notify the trustee or
any other bankruptcy official of his or her intention to seize, or even of
the existence of a claim prior to seizure.
Some courts have disputed this view. In R. v. Mathers,16 Wedge J.
held that the exercise by a secured creditor of the rights of realization
countenanced by section 69.3 (then section 49(2)) was subject to the
trustee's right under section 81 to receive a proof of claim before giving
up possession of collateral. She accordingly found a secured creditor's
agent, who had seized collateral without first obtaining the permission of
the trustee, to have violated section 203 (then section 174). Section 203,
in substance, stipulates that any person who removes property
mentioned in section 81 from the possession of the bankrupt without
permission of the trustee is guilty of an offence, unless thirty days have
passed since the filing of the proof of claim required by that section. The
fact that the defendants had ultimately established their entitlement to
seize the vehicles in question was irrelevant.
This decision rests on the view that secured creditors are subject
to the terms of section 81(1), which provides that any "person [who]
claims any property, or interest therein, in the possession of a bankrupt
at the time of the bankruptcy, ... shall file with the trustee a proof of
claim ... ." Read in isolation, this provision appears to apply to secured
creditors, since the assertion of a security interest represents a claim to
an interest in property. However, the view that security interests do not
13 Ibid. s. 124(1).
14 IbidL s. 124(5).
15 See Re McMurdo, [1902] 2 Ch. 684 (C.A.); and Shink v. Gingras, [1962] C.S. 297 (Qc. Sup.
Ct.).
16 (1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 133 (Sask. Prov. Ct.). See also R. v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (1977),
25 C.B.R. (N.S.) 283 (Man. Prov. Ct.); and R. v. Bank of Montreal (1984), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 287
(Man. Prov. Ct.), aff'd (1985), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 45 (Man. Q.B.), rev'd on other grounds (1986), 60
C.B.R. (N.S.) 169 (Man. C.A.).
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fall within its purview accords with the overall structure of the BIA, and
with its virtually uniform policy of non-intervention with the exercise of
rights of realization. In R. v. Ford Credit Canada Ltd., Austin J. argued
convincingly for this interpretation.1 7
The provisions of the BIA establishing the procedures specific to
the claims of secured creditors do not obligate a secured creditor to file
a proof of claim. Further, the wording and manifest objective of section
69.3(2), which exempts secured creditors from the automatic stay, are
inconsistent with the view that secured creditors' rights of realization are
delayed under the more general provisions of section 81. The distinctive
procedure established by section 81 must therefore be designed to
address a situation in which a person claims ownership of property in the
bankrupt's possession other than through the assertion of a security
interest.
The inclination of some courts to control the exercise by secured
creditors of their rights of seizure through the application of sections 81
and 203 is understandable. A secured creditor's election to seize the
security immediately after the initiation of the debtor's bankruptcy may
impair the trustee's ability to catalogue the bankrupt's assets, and to
ascertain the value of collateral with a view to determining whether it
has residual worth beyond the amount of the secured debt. However, the
thirty-day stay against seizure that might be imposed on secured
creditors by these sections could jeopardize the realization value of the
collateral by delaying a sale, harming the secured creditor and others
with a claim against tfie debtor's equity. Whether or not the BIA should
impose some restraint on the exercise of secured creditors' rights of
seizure, Austin J. rightly concludes that, in its present formulation, it
does not do so. 18
3. Mandatory sale or redemption of collateral by the trustee
Even without having received a proof of claim, the trustee should
be alerted to the existence of security interests to which the bankrupt's
property is subject, either through information provided in the debtor's
Statement of Affairs or by a search of the appropriate registries. Section
79 is designed to facilitate the trustee's determination of whether the
value of property held as security warrants its redemption by enabling
17 (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.8.) 266 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Ford Credit], leave to appeal to Court
of Appeal refused without comment on this point (1991), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
18 See Ford Credit, supra note 17 at 273-78.
1999]
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the trustee to temporarily delay realization. It prevents a secured
creditor from realizing his or her security until the trustee has been given
"a reasonable opportunity of inspecting the property and of exercising
the trustee's right of redemption," where the trustee has given a secured
creditor notice in writing of his or her intention to inspect. 19
The BIA also empowers the trustee to require a secured creditor
to provide an assessment of the value of the property in which a security
interest is claimed as a basis for the exercise of the right of redemption. 20
If the trustee is dissatisfied with the value assessed, he or she may
require that the property be sold.21 The trustee will, of course, redeem
the collateral or require its sale if there is some basis upon which to
believe that it is worth more than the debt owed the secured creditor,
potentially enhancing the estate of the bankrupt available for
distribution to unsecured claimants. However, neither the redemption
nor the forced sale of the collateral affects the substantive rights of the
secured creditor, who, in any event, will recover the value of the
security.22
4. Postponement of seizure by court order
Only one other procedural device is available to delay the
realization of a security interest. Section 69.3(2), which acknowledges
the general right of secured creditors to realize their security free of the
stay imposed by subsection (1), provides for a court order postponing
the exercise of rights of realization for up to six months. However, it
appears that such an order will be granted only where there is evidence
that the secured creditor is likely to realize in a fashion that will yield an
unreasonably low return, thereby unduly increasing the amount of that
creditor's claim that might be proven as an unsecured debt in the event
of a. deficiency, or perhaps prejudicing the interests of those entitled to
share in a potential surplus.
1 9 BM,supra note 1, s. 79.
20 Section 128, ibid., provides that the trustee may require the secured creditor to file a proof
of security, including an assessment of its value. The trustee may redeem the security on payment to
the secured creditor of the debt or the value of the security as assessed by the creditor.
2 1 1bia s. 129.
22 Under section 135, ibid., the trustee also has the power to disallow a claim or a security,
subject to a right of appeal to the court. This power simply protects the estate from the loss of
property through unfounded claims. It does not affect the holders of legitimate security interests.
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In Simpson Air, the Court refused an order postponing the
exercise by a private receiver of the secured creditor's right of sale where
the receiver had acted in an "economically efficient and commercially
reasonable manner."23 There was no clear evidence that a more
favourable sale could be achieved, in spite of the trustee's contention
that sale of the business as a going concern might reap a higher return.
Seizure or sale by the secured creditor will apparently be postponed only
if there are "cogent reasons"24 to conclude that he or she might not act
in such a way as to procure the highest possible return, thereby
prejudicing those entitled to participate in a surplus.25 This standard
mirrors the obligation imposed by provincial law on secured creditors
acting in a non-bankruptcy context to act in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner in exercising rights of realization.2 6
B. The Personal Obligation to Pay: Secured Creditors'
Recovery of Unsecured Debt
The privileged position of a secured creditor whose debtor has
become a bankrupt is coextensive with the value of the creditor's
security. The right to enforce the debt underlying a security interest is
distinct from, though obviously related to, the creditor's rights in the
collateral. Although a secured creditor's rights of realization are
substantially unimpaired by the BIA, the secured creditor stands in the
same position as an unsecured creditor with respect to enforcement of
the bankrupt debtor's personal obligation to pay.
A secured creditor may prove a claim for the entire amount of
the debt owed if he or she elects to surrender the security to the trustee
for the general benefit of creditors. 27 Similarly, a secured creditor may
prove a claim for any deficiency after deducting the net realization value
23 Simpson Air, supra note 11 at 192.
2 4 IbiL at 189, citing Re Dunham (1981), 40 C.B.R. (N.S.) 25 (Ont. S.C.).
25 In Re Les Pharmacies Modernes Inc. (1974), 19 C.B.R. 161 (Qc. Sup. Ct.), the court appears
to have adopted a less stringent standard in granting the trustee's application for a two-month
postponement of the secured creditor's realization of the bankrupt's assets.
26 See, for example, PpsA (B.c), supra note 7, s. 68(2).
2 7 See BtA, supra note 1, s. 127(2). Where a secured creditor has clearly surrendered its security
to the trustee, electing thereby to pursue the debt as an unsecured creditor, the secured creditor
may not thereafter assert any claim to the security. For the considerable body of case law on the
question of when a secured creditor will be regarded as having surrendered its security, see L.W.
Houlden & G.B. Morawetz, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, vol. 2, 3d ed., looseleaf
(Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at G§46A.
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or the assessed value of the security from the total amount of the debt.28
With regard to any portion of the debt that is unsecured, or that the
creditor elects to pursue as unsecured, the otherwise secured creditor is
thus entitled to vote at creditors' meetings and to share in any dividend
on the same basis as other unsecured creditors. The right to sue on the
personal obligation to pay is, of course, stayed by section 69.3(1) of the
BiA, subject to the discretionary power granted the court to lift the stay
under section 69.4.29
In practice, an undersecured creditor may not bother to submit a
proof of claim for a deficiency if the bankrupt's non-exempt property is
apparently of insufficient value to generate any meaningful payment of
unsecured debt. Conversely, creditors who are only nominally secured
often prove as if they were unsecured if there is not sufficient value in
the collateral to satisfy their claim, and there is some prospect that a
dividend may be paid.
C. Post-Discharge Enforcement of the Security Interest
and the Underlying Debt
The position of a secured creditor regarding enforcement of the
security interest and the debtor's personal obligation is determined by
the interplay of two fundamental principles embodied in the BIA. The
first is that an order of discharge releases the bankrupt from all claims
provable in bankruptcy.30 Since a secured debt, like any other, is a claim
provable in bankruptcy, one might think that the release by the
bankrupt's discharge of the debt secured would entail release of the
security interest it supports. However, that result is forestalled by the
intervention of the second fundamental principle, that a trustee in
bankruptcy is entitled to distribute only the "property of the bankrupt"
as it is defined by section 67 of the BIA. To the extent that such property
is subject to an enforceable third-party interest, that interest survives the
bankruptcy-both before and after the debtor's discharge. In other
words, proprietary interests vested before the bankrupt's discharge are
not property of the bankrupt subject to the bankruptcy proceedings,
except insofar as provisions of the BiA enable the trustee to acquire such
2 8 See BM, supra note 1, ss. 127(1), 128(2).
29 See Imperial Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Johnson (1923), 3 C.B.R. 707 (Alta. S.C. A.D.); Re
Rockland Chocolate and Cocoa Co., Ltd. (1921), 1 C.B.R. 452 (Ont. S.C.); and Dutch Canada Kent
Credit Union Ltd. v. Sprik (1981), 36 C.B.R. (N.S.) 179 (Ont. S.C.).
30 See BL4, supra note 1, s. 178(2).
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interests.31 If the trustee has not elected to redeem the security, a
secured creditor may accordingly enforce the security interest while the
debtor is in bankruptcy, or defer realization until after discharge.32
1. Post-discharge enforcement of the obligation to pay
The general discharge provision of the BIA is the statutory
incarnation of the "fresh start" policy constituting one of the primary
premises of Canadian bankruptcy law. The scope of that provision is
extremely broad. Section 178(2) provides that upon receiving his or her
discharge from bankruptcy, a debtor is "released" from all claims
provable in bankruptcy. Claims provable in bankruptcy, as defined by
section 121, include all debts, present or future, to which the bankrupt is
subject on the date of bankruptcy, or to which he or she may become
subject before discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before
bankruptcy. Since secured debt clearly falls within the broad wording of
section 121, the debtor is "released" by his or her discharge from the
personal obligation of payment the debt represents. Accordingly, a
secured creditor cannot sue to enforce the debt in personam, either in
full or to the extent of any deficiency claim that would otherwise arise in
cases in which the exercise of rights of realization against the collateral
does not, or will not, yield proceeds sufficient to retire the loan or credit
extended.
The BIA does not contemplate the preservation or revival of pre-
discharge debt obligations by agreement between the parties or
otherwise. However, that result may be achieved in the context of a
secured credit relationship under the general contract law principles of
compromise or forbearance. If the debtor's default entitles the secured
creditor to seize collateral that the debtor does not want to lose, the
debtor may well be prepared to agree to repay debt that would otherwise
be discharged, in return for the creditor's agreement to refrain from
exercising his or her rights of realization. The creditor's forbearance to
exercise an existing legal right is consideration for the debtor's
31 In the case of security interests, this may be accomplished through redemption of the
security: see ibid s. 128(3).
32 Section 130, ibid., enables a secured creditor to require the trustee to elect between either
exercising the power of redeeming the security or requiring the security to be realized.
1999]
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agreement to pay a sum of money. 33 The amount of debt
"affirmed"-or, to use the terminology of United States bankruptcy law,
"reaffirmed"-and the terms of payment may differ from what was
established by the contract under which the pre-discharge debt
originated.3 4 Whether or not the debtor has an incentive to resume a
payment obligation from which he or she would otherwise be absolved
by the discharge will depend on the importance the debtor attaches to
the item of collateral in question.
The potency of section 178(2) is confirmed by the courts'
characterization of its effect. In Holy Rosary Parish (Thorold) Credit
Union Ltd. v. Bye,35 Judson J. of the Supreme Court of Canada
addressed a creditor's post-discharge attempt to enforce a debt secured
by an assignment of wages granted by the debtor prior to his bankruptcy.
Dismissing the creditor's claim to wages accruing due after the debtor's
discharge, Judson J. said, "[t]here is no doubt that the borrowing by [the
debtor] from the credit union did create a debt provable in bankruptcy.
The debt has now gone by operation of law."36 In Re Pelyea and Canada
Packers Employees Credit Union Ltd.,37 MacKay J.A. of the Ontario
Court of Appeal said that the debt owed to a secured creditor at the
time of a bankruptcy is "extinguished," though the security in existence
at the date of the bankruptcy is not.38
33 It is trite law that a simple promise to pay an existing debt is not enforceable, since nothing
new is offered by way of consideration on the part of the creditor: see, for example, Foakes v. Beer
(1884), 9 A.C. 605 (H.L.). In the context of bankruptcy, a creditor's promise to forbear from suing
on a pre-discharge debt cannot be consideration, since the bankrupt is released by the discharge
from the obligation to pay that debt: see Heather & Son v. Webb (1876), 2 C.P.D. 1 (H.C.J.).
However, because a secured creditor's rights of realization survive the discharge, the forbearance to
exercise those rights can be consideration.
34 A contractually binding agreement to pay debt arising from an existing contract is
sometimes referred to in Canadian courts as "novation." The word is presumably referable to the
renewal or "novation" of the existing obligation. This terminology is used in Seaboard Acceptance
Corp. v. Moen (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 143 (B.C. C.A.).
35 [1967] S.C.R. 271 [hereinafter Bye].
3 6 Ibid. at 274. For a recent review of authorities supporting the view that debt is extinguished
by section 178(2), see the judgment of Scarth J. in Tildesley v. Weaver (4 August 1988), Victoria,
98 0483 (S.C.), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1838, online: QL (BCJ).
37 [1970] 2 O.R. 384 (C.A.) [hereinafter Re Pelyea].
3 8 Ibid. at 388.
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Others take the view that pre-discharge debt is rendered
unenforceable, though it notionally continues in existence 3 9 On either
view, a secured creditor clearly has no right to enforce the personal
promise of payment supporting a debt incurred prior to the debtor's
discharge in the absence of a contractually binding reaffirmation.
However, some courts have apparently failed to observe this principle,
opening the way for secured creditors to enforce the unsecured portion
of the debt owed after the debtor's discharge.
This problem stems from the short judgment rendered by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in Seaboard Acceptance Corporation v.
Moen.40 The bankrupt had maintained the payments due under an
automobile lease throughout her bankruptcy and for a period of time
after her discharge, but ultimately stopped making payments and
returned the vehicle to the lessor. The Court of Appeal endorsed the
trial decision, which granted Seaboard Acceptance Corporation
judgment for the balance due under the contract.
The Court of Appeal premised its decision on the assumption
that the debt claimed by Seaboard Acceptance Corporation under the
lease was a claim provable in bankruptcy. In response to the contention
that the lessee's discharge had released that debt, the Court held that
the contract continued throughout the bankruptcy and continued after the discharge
from bankruptcy; it was never terminated in accordance with its provisions for
termination, and the fact that there might have been a claim provable in bankruptcy, or
that a claim provable in bankruptcy might have been made, does not affect the fact that
the contract itself continued and continued to regulate the relationship of the parties
after the discharge from bankruptcy.41
This conclusion apparently rested on the maintenance of payments
throughout the lessee's bankruptcy and beyond, constituting what the
Court called an endorsement of the contract after her discharge.
Lambert J.A. specifically indicated that there had not been a novation of
the contract, merely a "continuation" of it.42
39 See Re Kryspin (1983), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 232 (Ont. S.C.); Re Handelman (1997), 48 C.B.R.
(3d) 29 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); and Gagnon v. Fiducie Desjardins (1992), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 92 (Oc.
S.C.), aff'd [1993] A.Q. No. 1645 (C.A.), online: QL (QJ). This view is consistent not only with the
wording used in the MA ("released" rather than "extinguished" or "nullified"), but also with the
continuation of the secured creditor's proprietary rights after discharge. A proprietary right or
interest comprising nothing more than a right to apply the value of the collateral to the satisfaction
of a debt presumes the existence of a debt to be satisfied. For authorities supporting this
characterization of the nature of a security interest, see note 54, infra.
40 Supra note 34 [hereinafter Seaboard].
41 Ibid. at 147.
42 Ibid.
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The decision in Seaboard is clearly insupportable in the absence
of a contractual reaffirmation of the debt or novation of the contract of
lease, which would depend on the existence of new consideration. 43 The
notion of a "continuation" of the contract is simply without intelligible
legal content. 44
The potential for application of the flawed reasoning in Seaboard
has apparently been realized in at least two recent cases. In Manulife
Bank of Canada v. Planting,4S Seaboard was cited as authority for the
view that a deficiency claim arising from a debt secured by a real
property mortgage could be enforced against the mortgagors after their
discharge from bankruptcy, on the grounds that the mortgagee had not
proven a claim in bankruptcy, and the debtors had remained in
possession of the security and paid interest on the debt throughout the
bankruptcy period. As in Seaboard, the court was explicit in not basing
its decision on a novation of the original mortgages.
The judgment in Manulife adds nothing to the reasoning
advanced in Seaboard. Although the mortgagees' appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal created an opportunity for the elucidation of the
Manulife decision, that opportunity was unfortunately lost, since the
Court dismissed the appeal without reasons, except as to the liability of
the male defendant under a guarantee executed before the bankruptcy.46
Any hope that this short and clearly insupportable line of
authority might be overlooked or avoided by other courts was recently
undermined by Hart J. of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in
C.LB. C. Mortgage Corp. v. Stenerson,47 confirming a deficiency judgment
granted in a foreclosure action commenced after the mortgagor's
discharge from bankruptcy. Hart J. quoted from Seaboard and from
43 Any estoppel that might be alleged on the grounds of the debtor's continuation of payments
cannot overcome the operation of the statutory provision. The principle that an estoppel cannot
supersede an obligation to perform a statutory duty is well established: see Kenora (Town) Hydro
Electric Commission v. Vacationland Dairy Co-operative Ltd., [1994] 1 S.C.R. 80. Analogous
reasoning would dictate that an estoppel cannot operate to enable a creditor to enforce an
obligation declared unenforceable (or extinguished) by statute.
44 In Scotia Mortgage Corp. v. Winchester (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 314 (Alta. Master), faced with
a submission based on Seaboard, Master Funduk distinguished the case on the basis that the court
appeared to have said that a new contract was entered into after the bankrupt went into bankruptcy.
Although this is clearly not what the court said in Seaboard, Master Funduk may be forgiven for
attempting to explain the decision away.
45 (1996), 43 C.B.R. (3d) 305 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [hereinafter Manulife], rev'd in part (9
January 1998), C26491, [1998] OJ No. 74 (C.A.) online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Manilife CA.].
46 See Manulife CA., supra note 45.
47 (1998), 220 A.R. 248 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Stenerson].
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Howden J. in Manulife. He then concluded that because the mortgagor
had "affirmed" the contractual relationship by making mortgage
payments throughout the bankruptcy, the mortgagee did not lose its
right to a deficiency judgment by reason of the mortgagor's
bankruptcy.48
The jurisprudence represented by Seaboard, Manulife, and
Stenerson is clearly inconsistent with the fresh start policy, which grounds
the release of provable claims occasioned by the discharge of a consumer
bankrupt, as well as with the clear wording of section 178(2). It
constitutes a significant enhancement of the already strong position
enjoyed by secured creditors-an enhancement that is unsupported by
either an articulated policy or a credible doctrinal analysis.
From a policy perspective, the contractual reaffirmation of pre-
bankruptcy debt might also be criticized for besmirching the clean
financial slate mandated by the fresh start policy. However, the validity
of such a reaffirmation is justified by the debtor's deliberate decision to
pay the stipulated price in order to preserve collateral that he or she
regards as vital, provided that the choice is informed and voluntary. The
reasoning in Seaboard effectively imposes a reaffirmation upon the
debtor without clear evidence that such a choice has been made or even
contemplated. Surely, the maintenance of payments and the retention of
the collateral cannot in themselves be regarded as conduct
demonstrating a decision to forego the benefits of discharge with respect
to the credit transaction in question. Such a course of conduct is more
likely indicative of the debtor's pragmatic attempt to retain possession of
the collateral, without any appreciation of the legal alternatives. 49
2. Security realization after the debtor's discharge from bankruptcy
There is no doubt that any security interest attached to property
of the bankrupt extant at the date of discharge survives the discharge,
and is enforceable by the secured creditor at a subsequent date,
notwithstanding the release of the underlying debt. As stated by Robins
J. in Manufacturers Life Insurance Company v. Burton,
48 Ibid. at 251.
49 In the United States, inadvertent reaffirmation of the kind countenanced by Seaboard
would be unthinkable. The potential for unconscionable manipulation of debtors presented by
enforcement of ostensibly voluntary reaffirmations of pre-discharge debt was clearly recognized by
the drafters of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1998). It requires, inter alia,
some evidence that reaffirmations represent a voluntary and informed choice, and that they are not
unduly prejudicial to the debtor's interests.
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[w]hile s.148(2) [now 178(2)] extinguishes the debts owed by a bankrupt at the time of
bankruptcy, it does not release the security of a creditor which validly existed at the time
of bankruptcy; the security continues in force although, as Bye and Pelyea establish, it
cannot attach to assets which come into existence subsequent to the date of discharge.50
In Re Pelyea,51 the Ontario Court of Appeal granted a credit
union's post-bankruptcy claim to enforce an assignment of the bankrupt
debtor's interest in an employees' profit-sharing plan, to the extent of
money accrued to him at (but not after) the date of his discharge.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in Bye52 held that an assignment
of the debtor's interest in an employee profit sharing fund could be
enforced by a creditor who had taken the assignment as security for a
pre-bankruptcy debt, to the extent of money accrued in the fund up to,
but not after, the date of the debtor's discharge from bankruptcy.
This view is not only authoritatively binding on lower courts, but
doctrinally correct. A security interest represents nothing more than a
right to resort to property of the debtor to satisfy an outstanding
payment obligation or debt. Since the interest adheres or "attaches"5 3 to
identified property and gives the creditor in rem rights of enforcement
against that property, it is a proprietary interest. However, the
proprietary interest is purely accessory to the debt supporting it. Once
the debt is satisfied and thus ceases to exist, the security interest
vanishes, since the creditor no longer has a right to resort to the
collateral for the debt's payment. Similarly, if section 178(2) of the BIA
either extinguishes pre-discharge debt or deprives the creditor of the
right to enforce it following the debtor's discharge, that debt cannot
support a security interest in property subsequently acquired by the
debtor. The creditor cannot have a right to resort to that property for
satisfaction of the pre-discharge debt, because the creditor has no right
to enforce the debt itself.
Both a security interest in personal property under the Canadian
PPSAS and a mortgage against land in a Torrens land registration
jurisdiction confer upon the creditor proprietary rights of this kind.
Neither system contemplates a transfer of title to the collateral to the
secured creditor as the basis of the creditor's rights of realization.
Rather, the security interest represents a prescribed bundle of rights vis-
50 (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 207 at 212 (Ont. S.C.).
5 1 Supra note 37.
52 Supra note 35.
53 This is the term used in the Canadian PPSAs, supra note 7, and in the United States Uniform
Commercial Code.
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ta-vis the collateral, conferred by the provincial statute under which the
interest arises.54 Although a real property mortgage in a non-Torrens
jurisdiction entails a formal transfer of title to the collateral by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee, the mortgagee's legal title is limited by the
debt it secures. The mortgagor's equity of redemption has been
described by the Supreme Court of Canada in terms indicating that the
modern common law mortgage constitutes no more than a charge on the
mortgagor's fee simple estate or title.55
In Bye and Re Pelyea, the nature of the collateral claimed by the
secured creditors was such that property in existence at the date of
discharge was clearly distinguishable from property acquired by the
debtor after his discharge from bankruptcy. Since the debt founding the
secured parties' claims was released by discharge, it clearly could not
thereafter support the creation of a security interest, which by definition
could not arise until the property claimed by the creditors as collateral
was acquired. The problem of ascertaining the extent of a secured
creditor's rights of realization is, however, more difficult when the
property in question cannot be readily categorized in units acquired
before or after the date of discharge.
In some cases involving a secured creditor's claim against an item
of property in existence at the date of the debtor's discharge, there
appears to be a troubling judicial predisposition to improperly extend
the principles established in Bye and endorsed in Re Pelyea. The question
such cases present is whether survival of the security interest entitles a
secured creditor to recover pre-discharge debt from appreciation in the
value of either the item of collateral or the debtor's equity in the
54 Cuming & Wood, supra note 3 at 22, suggest that the PPSA security interest is comparable to
the common law equitable charge and the Roman hypothecation or hypothec. Both conceptual
devices represent a right to resort to the collateral for payment to the extent of the debt secured.
Though the right is therefore proprietary in nature, it is not a right of ownership. See also R.C.C.
Cuming, "The Internationalization of Secured Financing Law: The Spreading Influence of the
Concepts of the UCC, Article 9 and its Progeny" in R. Cranston, ed., Making Commercial Law:
Essays in Honour of Roy Goode (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 597; and E.I. Sykes & S. Walker,
The Law of Securities, 5th ed. (New South Wales: Law Book, 1993) at 14. With respect to a
mortgage of land under a Torrens land registration system of real property law, see Roach, supra
note 3 at 8-16.
55 See Petranik v. Dale, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 959 at 986. A mortgagee's rights of foreclosure derive
from the right to recover the secured debt. If the collateral is worth more than the debt it secures,
the mortgagee will be required to sell the property, remitting the surplus proceeds to the debtor or
subordinate mortgagees claiming an interest in the equity of redemption. The mortgagee will not be
permitted to deprive the mortgagor of property in excess of the amount of the debt, since this would
result in the appropriation of the debtor's equity of redemption: see Roach, supra note 3 at 93-94.
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collateral. In my opinion, the answer dictated by the legal doctrine
founding these decisions is no.
In Andrew v. FarmStart,56 the unqualified proposition that a
security interest in a bankrupt's property survives the bankrupt's
discharge led the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal to allow a mortgagee to
appropriate what was, in substance, property acquired by a bankrupt
after his discharge. This decision appears to manifest the Court's failure
to consider the limited nature of a secured creditor's proprietary rights
in the debtor's property.
In FannStart, a parcel of land owned by the bankrupt was subject
to three mortgages, the first two of which secured debts that were
together in excess of the value of the land. FarmStart, the governmental
lending agency holding the third mortgage on the land, accordingly filed
in the bankruptcy as a preferred creditor, on the basis that the value of
its security was nil. A small dividend was paid on its claim, and the
bankrupt was discharged. The debts secured by the first and second
mortgages were thereafter paid, and the mortgages discharged. When
the bankrupt subsequently sold the land, FarmStart asserted a claim to
the proceeds on the basis of its mortgage, which was still registered
against the title. Having concluded, after some discussion, that the filing
of a proof of claim and acceptance of a dividend did not in the
circumstances constitute a surrender of security, the majority of the
Court went on to hold that FarmStart was entitled to assert its claim as
mortgagee on the ground that "[a] secured creditor may realize upon his
security after discharge of the bankrupt."57
With respect, the Court of Appeal in FarmStart failed to
recognize that the third mortgagee had no proprietary interest in the
bankrupt's property at the time of discharge, because its claim against
the title as security was devoid of content. Although the mortgagee's
registration of its claim against the debtor's title might have attracted
statutory procedural rights, that fact does not entail the creation of a
substantive interest.58 The value of the land was fully encumbered by the
first and second mortgages. There was simply no "property" left against
56 (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 124 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter FarmStart], leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) xxvii.
5 7 FarmStart, supra note 56 at 139.
5 8 FarnStart was decided in Saskatchewan under a Torrens registry system of real property
law. The effect of registration is also pertinent to the claim of a creditor who has registered a
security interest in personal property in a provincial PPSA registry. Though registration as a "secured
creditor" entitles that claimant to such procedural rights as notice of sale by prior secured creditors,
it cannot confer a proprietary interest where no property is available to satisfy the right to payment
constituting the statutory charge.
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which the third mortgagee could assert a claim. FarmStart therefore did
not have an interest that could survive the bankrupt's discharge because
it had no interest at the time of his discharge. Its claim rested on an
unsecured debt which, by virtue of the operation of section 178(2), was
released by the discharge and could not be revived through the assertion
of a non-existent security interest. This conclusion is clearly mandated by
the decision in Re Pelyea, which was quoted by the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal in support of its apparently contradictory decision in
FarmStart.
The same issue was raised in the Ontario case of Patrie v. Royal
Bank,59 on facts directly paralleling those in FarmStart, except that the
collateral in issue was an automobile rather than land. Ferguson J.
denied the post-discharge attempt of a bank that had registered a
security interest against the vehicle to exercise rights of realization. The
attempted recovery was denied on the ground that, at the time of the
bankrupt's discharge, there was no property to which the interest could
have attached. The value of the collateral was fully encumbered by a
prior security interest. Although the Court's reasoning is cursory, it
quoted and properly applied Re Pelyea as authority for its decision.
The same result should follow in the case of property owned by
the bankrupt at the date of discharge, with respect to any appreciation in
its value following discharge. If the land in FarmStart had remained
subject to the first and second mortgages but, following the discharge,
appreciated to a value in excess of the debts secured by them, a post-
bankruptcy claim by the third mortgagee would be similarly unfounded.
This reasoning is also relevant to the claim of a creditor under a
security agreement that confers a security interest in after-acquired
property. Clearly, a security interest securing a pre-discharge debt
cannot attach to assets acquired by the debtor after his or her discharge
from bankruptcy, notwithstanding the wording of the security agreement
or the fact of registration of the creditor's claim. The debt is either
extinguished or rendered unenforceable by the discharge. It cannot,
therefore, support a post-discharge proprietary interest. The reasoning
in FarmStart, however, would lead to the contrary result.60 If a security
interest can attach to new property acquired by the debtor in the form of
increased equity in the subject collateral, an interest in after-acquired
property can presumably attach to new assets caught by an after-
acquired property clause.
59 (1994), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 89 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
60 The significance of the FarmStart decision is, unfortunately, magnified by the fact that an
application for leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court of Canada: see note 56, supra.
1999]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 37 NOS. 1 & 2
The view that post-discharge increases in value or equity are
after-acquired property to which a security interest founded on pre-
discharge debt cannot attach is most compelling in connection with
Torrens system mortgages and PPSA security interests. However, the
substantive similarities between the proprietary interest held by a
common law mortgagee of land, and the charge held by a Torrens
system mortgagee or PPSA secured creditor, justifies application of the
same reasoning in non-Torrens jurisdictions. Though the common law
mortgagee formally holds title to the land, the interest is clearly limited
to the right to recover the debt supporting the mortgage. The
mortgagee's equity of redemption so qualifies the mortgagee's
proprietary interest that, functionally, it operates in the same way and
represents the same kind of claim as does the statutory charge of the
Torrens mortgagee. The common law mortgagee does not hold
unqualified rights of "ownership" that would entitle the mortgagee to
assert a claim against whatever value the land might have from time to
time.
Where a creditor asserts rights of realization against post-
discharge appreciation in the value of collateral or in the value of the
debtor's equity, determination of the validity and extent of that assertion
will require valuation of the property claimed as at the date of discharge.
This is not an enormous problem if the collateral has a market value that
can be ascertained or at least approximated at any given point in time.
However, the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Chetty v.
Burlingham Associates Inc. 61 demonstrates the problems of valuation
that may arise in connection with some forms of intangible collateral.
In Chetty, the Court considered the claim of a bank to a security
interest in fees paid to a lawyer after his discharge, pursuant to a
contingency agreement made before his bankruptcy. The Court
concluded that the bank was entitled to the fees on the basis of its
security interest in the bankrupt's accounts, since "an absolute discharge
in bankruptcy does not prevent a secured creditor from pursuing its
security."62 This decision is correct if the value of the chose representing
the bankrupt's right to payment was, at the date of his discharge,
equivalent to the amount of the contingency fee ultimately paid.
However, as at the date of discharge the account might be viewed as
worthless, since there was no assurance a fee would ever be paid. The
problem of valuation is not addressed by the court.
61 (1995), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 297 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Chetty], leave to appeal to S.C.C.
"refused (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) vii.
62 Chetty, supra note 61 at 307, citing FarmStart, supra note 56.
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If the courts in Saskatchewan or elsewhere continue on the path
set by FarmStart, secured creditors may congratulate themselves on their
remarkable good fortune. Faced with their debtor's bankruptcy,
creditors whose security is valueless due to the existence of prior
encumbrances may prove their claim as an unsecured creditor and take
whatever is available by way of dividend. They may then simply wait until
prior secured claims are paid off, at which time they may seize the
collateral in satisfaction of the remaining balance of what was, at the
date of the debtor's bankruptcy, an unsecured debt. This course of
action entails the risk that the secured creditor adopting it might be
deemed to have surrendered his or her security to the trustee, thereby
precluding its subsequent enforcement. However, recent cases, including
FarmStart itself, suggest that the risk is minimal, since the filing of a
proof of claim and even the acceptance of a dividend will not necessarily
be regarded as conclusive evidence of a surrender of security.63
Whether or not it is technically wrong, some would contend that
the outcome in FarmStart is defensible as a matter of policy. One might
argue that a person who takes a security interest in property knowing
that the debtor's interest is fully encumbered does so in anticipation of
the potential creation of equity supporting his or her security, either
through appreciation of the property or through the discharge of the
prior security interests. This view carries some weight in connection with
the advance of credit secured by an interest in property that may be
expected to appreciate in value.
On the other hand, credit advanced on the basis of a subordinate
security interest or deficient collateral value is presumably advanced on
terms reflecting the limited likelihood that it may be repaid through
realization. Creditors with enough sophistication to require security will
or should know that their security may ultimately prove to be of
insufficient or no value, depending on the vagaries of the real estate
market and other variables, including the potential bankruptcy of the
debtor.
Some pertinent observations are made by the authors of a
respected study of consumer bankruptcy in the United States.64 In their
examination of the role of secured credit in consumer bankruptcy, they
note that nominally secured credit offered by large and experienced
financial institutions is often significantly undersecured, exposing those
lenders to the risk of considerable losses in the foreseeable event of their
63 See FarmStart, supra note 56; and Re Pelyea, supra note 37.
64 See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L.Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 282-92.
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debtors' bankruptcies. This is true of loans advanced to the proprietors
of small businesses, as well as those qualifying as strictly consumer loans.
They point out that this apparently prevalent course of action on the
part of American lenders is explicable if the loans advanced on this basis
are sufficiently profitable to justify assuming an appreciable risk of
loss.65 Simply put, lenders appear to be prepared to advance credit
knowing full well that their security may not support recovery of the debt
in the event of default or bankruptcy.
Since the observations and inferences advanced by these authors
are supported by American statistics, they may not be directly relevant to
the Canadian credit market. However, if in fact creditors are prepared to
advance ostensibly secured credit on an undersecured or even effectively
unsecured basis, knowing full well that the likelihood of full recovery in
the event of default is uncertain at best, the standard rationales for the
preferential treatment of secured creditors (i.e., protection of voluntary
risk allocations and minimization of the cost of credit) are of little
consequence in this connection.
William Whitford argues that post-discharge reaffirmations of
debt owed by consumers to secured creditors should be permitted in the
United States, in at least some circumstances, for reasons of policy.66
Such reaffirmation would, of course, be accompanied by a right to
enforce the security interest securing the debt. It is not clear whether the
policy arguments he advances are persuasive in the different context of
the Canadian credit market, since there are no data demonstrating the
impact of post-discharge enforceability on interest rates or creditor
practices. In any event, there is nothing in Canadian bankruptcy law to
preclude contractual reaffirmations. What is objectionable is the judicial
imposition of outcomes that impose reaffirmation through post-
discharge enforcement of statutorily released debt, either by way of in
personam enforcement of deficiency claims on the tenuous ground of
"continuation" of the contractual relationship, or through the approval
of realization against property value acquired after discharge.
Regardless of whether policy arguments based on assumptions
about creditor practices and the cost of borrowing would, on balance,
support or deny post-discharge enforcement of secured creditors' rights,
these policy considerations cannot validate judicially mandated
65 Theresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence infer from their analysis of the data
presented that the most knowledgeable lenders engage in high-risk lending, suggesting that loan
losses are part of a larger balance of risk and return: see ibid. at 290.
66 See W.C. Whitford, "Secured Creditors and Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339.
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outcomes that are contrary to the provisions of the BiA and the doctrinal
underpinnings of relevant provincial law. Until such time as the fresh
start demanded by section 178(2) of the BIA is qualified by statutory
amendment, creditor realization against property acquired by a debtor
after a discharge from bankruptcy is improper.
III. SECURED CREDITORS AND CONSUMER PROPOSALS
The 1992 consumer proposal provisions found in Part III,
Division 2 of the BIA6 7 are designed to enable consumer debtors to
restructure their payment obligations through binding composition
agreements with their creditors. However, those provisions leave secured
creditors virtually untouched, unless they elect to subject themselves to
the terms of a proposal. Though a consumer proposal may address the
payment of secured claims, an approved proposal is binding on secured
creditors only in respect of secured claims that have been voluntarily
made subject to its terms through the filing of a proof of claim.68 A
creditor who files a proof of a secured claim is bound by the proposal if
it is approved by the general body of creditors.69 If a secured creditor
chooses not to file a proof of claim, there is nothing to prevent or qualify
the exercise of the creditor's rights of realization, provided that the
debtor is in default under the security agreement.
Once a consumer proposal has been filed, section 66.34(1)
prevents the termination of a security agreement or the acceleration of
payments due through the operation of a contractual definition of
default that would trigger those events upon the debtor's insolvency or
the filing of a proposal. However, if default is otherwise established,
secured creditors may realize against their security, free of the general
stay precipitated by the filing of a consumer proposal. 70 Section 69.2
specifically recognizes secured creditors' rights of realization in terms
identical to those applicable to them under section 69.3 in cases of
outright bankruptcy.
6 7 See mA,supra note 1, ss. 66.11-66.40, as am. by 1992Amendments,supra note 4, s. 32(1).
68 Ibid. s. 66.28(2)(b).
69 Ibid. ss. 66.18(1), 66.19(1). Section 66.12(4)(b) of the Act provides that a secured creditor
may respond to a consumer proposal by filing with the administrator a proof of claim in the manner
provided for in sections 124-134, which are the provisions otherwise applicable to the proof of
claims by secured creditors in cases of outright bankruptcy.
70 Ibid. s. 69.2.
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It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a secured
creditor would choose to be subject to the opinion of the majority of
general creditors. Non-participation preserves all the secured creditor's
rights of realization without precluding the secured creditor from
challenging the proposal before a court, should the creditor perceive it
to be prejudicial to its interests. The filing of a proof of claim would be
advantageous only to an undersecured creditor who wishes to establish
the unsecured portion of the claim so that it may participate in the
payments to unsecured creditors.71 Secured creditors can, and do, file a
proof with respect to the unsecured portion of their claim, while
retaining their rights of realization against the collateral, free of the
terms of the proposal.
There appears to be no case law challenging a secured creditor's
right to sue for any deficiency, or unsecured portion of the debt, on the
basis of the approval or completion of a consumer proposal in which the
secured creditor has not participated. Cases that address proposals
falling within what is now Part III, Division 1 of the BIA confirm that a
proposal operates as a contract of settlement or compromise, albeit one
imposed by the statute on dissenting creditors.7 2 If a secured creditor has
not brought a claim within the application of the proposal, one might
therefore contend that neither the rights of realization nor the right to
enforce the unsecured portion of the debt is subject to any contractual or
quasi-contractual satisfaction imposed by it.
However, section 66.28(2) contradicts this conclusion. It provides
that an accepted consumer proposal is binding upon "(a) all unsecured
claims, and (b) secured claims for which proofs of claim have been
filed." The provision is referable, not to the class of creditor asserting a
claim as either secured or unsecured, but to the character of the claim
affected by the proposal. One might legitimately contend that the
unsecured portion of a debt, determined as at the time of the filing of
the proposal, is therefore subject to its terms.73 Performance of the
proposal should thus be viewed as satisfying the unsecured claim, even if
the creditor has not filed a proof of claim and accordingly has not
71 Section 66.4, ibid., provides that all the provisions of the Act, except Part 111, Division 1
apply with such modifications as may be required to consumer proposals. The filing of a proof of
claim is accordingly necessary to establish an entitlement to the payments contemplated by the
proposal, which may be analogized to the "dividends" payable by a trustee in a bankruptcy.
72 See, for example, Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 230.
73 Section 66.28(1) of the mA, supra note 1, provides that the time with respect to which the
claims of creditors shall be determined is the time of the filing of the consumer proposal.
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received any payment. While this view raises potential problems in
determining the value of the collateral at the date of the proposal, these
difficulties are no greater than those arising in connection with
quantification of the deficiency claim released by a debtor's discharge
from bankruptcy.
As a practical matter, secured creditors are in a position to
dominate or defeat any effort at financial rehabilitation through the
formulation of a consumer proposal. The preservation of secured
creditors' rights of realization independent of a proposal means that the
consumer must give priority to the maintenance of payments required to
keep security agreements in good standing, thereby preventing seizure of
collateral that plays an important or even essential role in his or her
personal or business life. The need to channel available income to a very
few creditors undoubtedly means that many financially crippled
consumers are unable to make a meaningful attempt to satisfy unsecured
claims. Since a consumer's bankruptcy poses little threat to the position
of a well secured creditor, the creditor may have little incentive to
accommodate the successful completion of a proposal as an alternative
to outright bankruptcy.
IV. PROVINCIAL LIMITATIONS ON SECURED
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Bankruptcy law as such falls within federal constitutional
jurisdiction.7 4 However, provincial laws governing matters of property
and civil rights interface with federal bankruptcy law at several
important junctures. The provincial definition of the rights ascribed to
those holding security interests in real and personal property,
respectively, provides the legal content underlying the terms "secured
creditor," "security," and associated language employed by the BIA.
Differences among the statutory regimes of the provinces and territories
make absolute generalizations impossible. However, the law of most
provinces potentially affects the exercise of secured creditors' rights
against a bankrupt consumer and his or her property in at least two
notable respects.
74 See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 2, s. 91(21).
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A. Defeat of Unperfected Security Interests in Personal Property
by the Trustee
The territories and all of the provinces other than Quebec and
Newfoundland have adopted a PPSA. 75 This legislation regulates the
creation, enforcement, and priority ranking of security interests in
personal property in comprehensive terms and, in so doing, defines a
"secured creditor" and delineates its fundamental rights.
The rights of realization conferred upon secured creditors by
provincial law are essentially unaffected by the debtor's bankruptcy.
However, one PPSA provision operates exclusively in bankruptcy to
defeat a secured creditor's right to take the bankrupt's property in
satisfaction of the secured debt. That provision prescribes that a security
interest in collateral that is not perfected at the date of bankruptcy is not
effective against the trustee in bankruptcy.76 This provision entitles a
trustee in bankruptcy to take collateral subject to an unperfected
security interest and distribute its proceeds free of that interest. In
effect, this enables the trustee to exercise on behalf of unsecured
creditors their pre-bankruptcy right to defeat an unperfected security
interest in prescribed circumstances. 77
While this result thwarts the secured creditor, it will not
materially affect the consumer bankrupt in most cases. If the secured
creditor would otherwise have realized its security interest, the loss of
the collateral to the trustee is of no consequence unless the proceeds are
applied to reduce non-dischargeable debt. If the secured creditor would
have refrained from seizure in the expectation that payments would be
75 See note 7,supra. In Quebec, the rights of secured creditors are defined in distinctive terms
by the Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64; and the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-25.
76 See, for example, i'I'sA (itc), supra note 7, s. 20(b)(i). Under the PPSAS of all provinces but
Ontario, this provision extends to chattel leases for a term of more than one year. In Re Giffen,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 91, it enabled the trustee of a bankrupt lessor to take the vehicle subject to the lease
in priority to the lessee, whose interest is characterized by theAct as a deemed security interest. The
security interest was unperfected by virtue of the lessee's failure to register it in the personal
property security registry.
77 Outside bankruptcy, this is accomplished by taking judgment enforcement measures against
property of the debtor: see, for example, P'sA (n.c), supra note 7, s. 20(a). Such measures are
precluded after the debtor's bankruptcy by the automatic stay: see ibid. s. 69.3(1). For a discussion
of this rationale, see International Harvester Credit Corp. of Canada v. Bell's Dairy Ltd. (1986), 61
C.B.R. (N.S.) 193 (Sask. C.A.); and Re Giffen, supra note 76.
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maintained, the consumer may be disadvantaged by the loss of the
collateral to his or her unsecured creditors.78
A secured creditor whose debtor has made a consumer proposal
instead of declaring bankruptcy is not affected by this provision, because
it operates only in favour of a "trustee in bankruptcy."7 9 There is
therefore no substantive basis upon which the claim of a creditor whose
security interest is unperfected can be challenged by the administrator of
a consumer proposal. Since unsecured creditors are subject to the stay
imposed by section 69.2(1) upon the filing of a proposal, they are
precluded from defeating the unperfected security interest by seizing the
collateral through judgment enforcement measures. The holder of an
unperfected security interest is therefore much better served by the
making of a consumer proposal than by the debtor's bankruptcy.
B. The Role of Provincial Exemptions Law and
Statutory Restrictions on Seizure
The exemptions legislation of the provinces serves chiefly to
exempt identified items of property from seizure under execution.8 0
Though it operates in a debtor's favour within, as well as outside,
bankruptcy, it does not directly affect the position of secured creditors,
since it generally does not preclude seizure of the debtor's assets for
purposes of security realization.81
78 If the item in question is exempt from seizure under provincial law, the secured creditor's
rights will not be affected by the PPSA provision under discussion: see Part IV(B), below.
79 See, for example, tPsA (.c), supra note 7, s. 20(b)(i).
80 Exempting provisions are contained in a range of statutes under a variety of names. Most
apply to seizures under legal processes identified as "execution," though some use other
terminology designating judgment enforcement measures more generally. The following are the
pertinent provincial statutes: Alberta, Civil Enforcement Act, S.A. 1994, c. C-10.5; British Columbia,
Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 78, ss. 71, 72; British Columbia, Homestead Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 197, s. 4; Manitoba, Executions Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. E160; New Brunswick,
Memorials and Executions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-9, s. 33; Nova Scotia, Judicature Act, R.S.N.S.
1989, c. 240, s. 45; Ontario, Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E-24; Prince Edward Island, Judgment and
Execution Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. J-2; Quebec, Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 75, arts. 552-
553.2; Saskatchewan, The Exemptions Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. E-14; Saskatchewan, The Saskatchewan
Farm Security Act, S.S. 1988-89, c. S-17.1, ss. 65, 66; Northwest Territories, Exemptions Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. E-9, s. 2; and Yukon Territory, Exemptions Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 59, s. 2.
81 The Saskatchewan Exemptions Act, supra note 80, may be regarded as an exception in that it
allows a debtor to claim as exempt from seizure and sale under a security agreement the chattels
that are exempt from seizure under execution, subject to a purchase money security interest proviso.
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A variety of provincial statutes do impose modest restrictions on
secured creditors' rights to seize collateral. Since they apply equally to
the exercise of rights of realization within and outside of bankruptcy,
they merit only cursory review in an examination of secured creditors'
rights in bankruptcy.
No province or territory precludes seizure of real property by
way of mortgage foreclosure or other security enforcement proceedings.
Only four provinces absolutely prohibit the seizure of identified kinds of
essential personal goods by secured creditors,8 2 and those prohibitions
generally protect personal assets only to the extent of a relatively small
dollar value. Furthermore, they generally do not apply to purchase
money financiers. In a number of provinces, PPSA provisions protect
consumer goods from seizure if loss of the goods would cause serious
hardship to the debtor, or if the debtor has paid most of the total debt
secured.83
Provincial statutes exempting property from seizure under
execution can operate to boost the position of a secured creditor holding
an unperfected security interest in such property in PPSA jurisdictions.
The exempt property that is subject to the security interest is excluded
from distribution as part of the bankrupt debtor's estate by section
67(1)(b) of the BIA. The trustee is thus unable to seize that property. If
no provincial statute precluding seizure of the collateral by secured
creditors affects the item of property in question, the secured creditor
will be able to realize its security interest. Had the property not been
exempt, the provincial PPSA would render the security interest
"ineffective" against the trustee in bankruptcy, enabling the trustee to
take the collateral in priority to the secured creditor.
Limitations on seizure are also imposed by "seize or sue"
legislation in six provinces and the territories. 8 4 In general, such
82 See ibid.; PPSA (N.B.), supra note 7, s. 58; mI'SA (N.s.), supra note 7, s. 59; and rI'SA (r.E..), supra
note 7, s. 58.
83 See PPsA (N.B.), supra note 7, ss. 58(3)(d), 58(4); tPsA (N.s.), supra note 7, ss. 59(3)(d), 59(4);
PPSA (P..F), supra note 7, ss. 58(3)(d), 58(4); msA (.c.), supra note 7, s. 58(3); Manitoba, Consuner
Protection Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. S200, ss. 49, 57 [hereinafter CA (MAN.)]; Yukon, Consumer Protection
Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 31, ss. 49, 57 [hereinafter ct'i (.)]; Northwest Territories, Consumer Protection
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-17, ss. 60, 67 [hereinafter c'a (N.w.r.)].
84 See CPA (MAN), supra note 83, s. 53; Newfoundland, Conditional Sales Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.
C-28, s. 13; Newfoundland, Bills of Sale Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. B-3, s. 15; CiA (N. i.va), supra note 83, s.
64; cpA (y.), supra note 83, s. 53; Alberta, Law of Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-8, s. 49 (all re-cn.
1988, c. P-4.05, s. 87; s. 49 am. 1991, c. 21, s. 18); and rrsA (u.c.), supra note 7, s. 67. The
Saskatchewan Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16, s. 18 (as am. by S.S. 1979-80, c. 29,
s. 3; 1988-89, c. 52, s. 12(7); 1992, c. 43, s. 3(2)) imposes a seize-only regime.
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legislation prevents a seller of goods from both realizing a security
interest taken in the goods to secure the seller's purchase price, and
suing on the debt to recover a deficiency. However, the scope and
mechanics of the various statutes limiting secured creditors' rights in this
manner differ.85 None of this legislation imposes a significant hardship
on secured creditors whose debtors have become bankrupt, since their
rights of realization against the collateral are, in any event, much more
valuable in a bankruptcy than any ability to enforce the debt itself. The
likelihood of any meaningful recovery on unsecured debt is notoriously
slight.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing discussion are
fairly obvious. Secured creditors dealing with a bankrupt debtor, or a
debtor whose financial disability has prompted the making of a
consumer proposal, enjoy the best of two worlds. Most importantly, they
may recover the portion of their debt secured by the debtor's property
through direct realization measures, unimpeded by the BIA. Bankruptcy
law neither limits secured creditors' rights of realization, nor subjects
them to any involuntary adjustment of repayment schedules. Though
provincial law imposes some restrictions on secured creditors' rights of
realization, they are no more onerous after the debtor's bankruptcy than
before. In addition, secured creditors may participate in distributions
available under a bankruptcy or proposal with respect to the unsecured
portion of the debt in the same manner as fully unsecured creditors.
The preservation of rights of realization after the debtor's
discharge from bankruptcy places secured creditors in a particularly
powerful position. It enables them to renegotiate the credit agreement,
providing for post-bankruptcy payment of unsecured, as well as secured,
debt as the price of their forbearance from seizure of the collateral. Such
agreements are not subject to judicial supervision or statutory
regulation.
We have seen that these rights have been extended by judicial
decisions addressing post-discharge enforcement of the security interest
and of the debtor's personal obligation to pay. Some courts have allowed
the realization of a security interest in equity acquired by the debtor
after his or her discharge. Others have endorsed post-discharge
enforcement of the debt. While both outcomes are insupportable as a
85 See ibid.
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matter of both law and policy, there is currently no obstacle to further
extension of the lines of authority sustaining them.
Secured creditors fare as well under consumer proposals as they
do in an outright bankruptcy. The fact that they are subject to the terms
of a consumer proposal only if they elect to participate means that such
proposals cannot be used effectively as a device to restructure payment
schedules on secured loans, or to delay or prevent the seizure of assets.
Current administrative and statutory policy is designed to promote the
use of consumer proposals as an alternative to bankruptcy,8 6 apparently
in the hope of achieving higher levels of debt repayment as well as
debtor rehabilitation. One may infer that these policies are, in part, a
response to the common charge that bankruptcy law is "soft" on debtors.
Regardless of motivation, the objective of achieving successful consumer
proposals is likely to be thwarted so long as secured creditors are
excluded.
This situation may be regarded as tolerable, on the view that
secured creditors' rights are no better in bankruptcy or under a
consumer proposal than they would have been had those circumstances
not arisen. Bankruptcy law simply preserves the rights to which secured
creditors are in any event entitled. However, the force of that rationale is
considerably weakened by the juxtaposition of secured creditors' rights
with those of unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy law is fully prepared to
tinker with-or even obliterate-the rights of unsecured creditors, while
leaving secured creditors unscathed. It is not self-evident that the rights
of secured creditors should be preserved in bankruptcy, while those of
unsecured creditors should not. No one doubts that the objectives of
debtor rehabilitation and equitable treatment of creditors justify
wholesale intervention in the legal position of unsecured creditors.
Rather remarkably, it appears that little attention has been paid, at least
by government, to the question of whether those objectives similarly
justify some modification of secured creditor rights, particularly in the
context of consumer bankruptcy.
86 If, in the opinion of the court, a bankrupt could have made a viable proposal, but "chose
bankruptcy ... as a means to resolve the indebtedness," an absolute discharge must be refused: see
BL,supra note 1, ss. 172, 173(I)(n).
